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ABSTRACT
Unpaid internships have become increasingly common in 
recent years because of the economic benefit provided to businesses 
and the real-world experience afforded to students. While this 
increase in unpaid internships has provided advantages to students 
and employers, it has also created concerns regarding the legality of 
unpaid internships under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA). Though the FLSA was created with the goal of ensuring that 
all employees receive compensation for their work, the FLSA does 
not address whether workers in unconventional working 
relationships, such as internships, fall within the definition of 
employees, which would entitle them to compensation and other 
federal protections.
Currently, a circuit court split exists regarding the appropriate 
test for classifying unpaid interns under the FLSA. The Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Circuits utilize a primary benefit test to determine which 
party receives the primary benefit of the working relationship, while 
the Tenth Circuit and lower courts in the Second Circuit utilize a 
totality of the circumstances test. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit 
uses an economic reality test to determine which party benefits 
economically from the relationship. As a result, student interns are 
classified differently throughout the nation, creating a disparity in 
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the level of protection these students receive under federal law. 
Current scholarship addressing this issue has focused primarily on 
legislative and regulatory solutions; however, neither Congress nor 
the Department of Labor has responded with a controlling solution, 
leaving many unpaid interns with no protection from employers who 
exploit them as free labor while providing little to no educational 
benefit in return. 
The Supreme Court should address the issue of how unpaid 
interns are classified under the FLSA to provide greater protections 
for students who are being illegally exploited by employers. By 
adopting the primary benefit test from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Circuits and supplementing this test with the Department of Labor 
guidelines issued in Fact Sheet #71, the Court can provide a uniform 
standard for classifying interns under the FLSA. This solution would 
properly balance the interests of employers and students to ensure 
that employers can utilize unpaid internships without violating the 
FLSA and to ensure that students who do not receive an educational 
benefit from their unpaid internship receive monetary compensation 
under the FLSA.
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INTRODUCTION
From 2009 to 2010, Eric Glatt and Alexander Footman worked 
as student interns on the set of the box office hit Black Swan.1 Glatt 
and Footman consistently worked forty to fifty hours per week,2
performing mundane tasks such as running files, overseeing purchase 
orders, and picking up paychecks.3 Despite the fact that Black Swan 
grossed over $300 million in revenue, these students did not receive 
any compensation for their work, nor did they receive any college 
credit for the internship.4 In October 2011, Glatt and Footman filed 
suit against Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., claiming the status of 
employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that would 
entitle them to minimum wage and overtime compensation for the 
work they performed.5 Almost two years later, on June 11, 2013, the 
Southern District of New York ruled in favor of Glatt and Footman, 
holding that an employment relationship had been created under the 
FLSA and that Glatt and Footman should have received 
compensation for their work.6
1. Abby Ellin, Lawsuit: Unpaid Film Interns Considered Employees, ABC
NEWS (June 13, 2013, 1:39 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2013/06/
lawsuit-unpaid-film-interns-considered-employees/. 
2. Id.
3. Rebecca Greenfield, The ‘Black Swan’ Intern Ruling Could Change 
Unpaid Internships Forever, ATL. WIRE (June 12, 2013, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/06/black-swan-intern-ruling/66168/.
4. Ellin, supra note 1.
5. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 521-23
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (examining whether student interns were employees under the 
FLSA). 
6. Id. at 534. 
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In recent years, internships—particularly unpaid internships—
have become increasingly prevalent in the United States.7 Although 
exact numbers are unavailable, it is estimated that undergraduate 
students obtain over one million internships each year in the United 
States, over half of which are unpaid.8 Though the number of unpaid 
internships has increased rapidly in recent years,9 the law governing 
employment relationships has not kept up with the internship boom.10
In fact, the most relevant Supreme Court case interpreting the FLSA 
was decided in 1947, decades before the rise of unpaid internships.11
As a result, unpaid internships have continued to increase in number 
with little guidance as to whether interns are protected as employees
under the FLSA.12
The problems created by this lack of guidance are numerous 
and detrimental. For instance, without standards governing the 
classification of interns, employers exploit students as free labor, 
leading to serious problems in the areas of minimum wage and 
overtime compensation.13 In fact, Glatt was unusual in that it was the 
7. See Natalie Bacon, Note, Unpaid Internships: The History, Policy, and 
Future Implications of “Fact Sheet #71,” 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 67, 
68, 74 (2011).
8. Steven Greenhouse, Judge Rules That Movie Studio Should Have Been 
Paying Interns, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at B1. Neither the DOL nor any other 
organization keeps official statistics regarding the number of unpaid internships each 
year, making it difficult to properly compute these numbers. Bacon, supra note 7, at 
69; see also ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN 
LITTLE IN THE BRAVE NEW ECONOMY 26-28 (2011).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
10. The Supreme Court and circuit courts have in the past ruled that unpaid 
individuals should have received compensation as employees under the FLSA, but 
prior to the decision in Glatt, no court had ruled this way with regard to unpaid 
interns. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 
(1985) (holding that volunteer workers were employees under the FLSA because 
they were entirely dependent on the employer for extended periods of time); 
McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that snack food 
distribution trainees were employees under the FLSA because the employer received 
the primary benefit of the working relationship).
11. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) (analyzing 
whether railroad trainees could be classified as employees under the FLSA for 
compensation purposes).  
12. PERLIN, supra note 8, at 62-64. 
13. Jessica L. Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid 
Internships, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1537-38 (2010). In the case of unpaid interns, employers are 
also not required to provide protections against sexual harassment or employment 
discrimination unless the interns are statutorily classified as employees; however, 
these issues are outside the scope of this Note. For a more complete discussion of 
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first suit brought by unpaid interns where the court ruled in favor of 
the interns.14 To date, several legislative solutions have been 
proposed with little response from legislators or government 
officials.15 Additionally, circuit courts have attempted to resolve this 
problem;16 however, because Supreme Court precedent interpreting 
the FLSA is unclear and does not address internships, circuits have
reached different conclusions, leading to uncertainty regarding intern 
classification under federal law.17
Without a clear and uniform standard for classifying unpaid 
interns, courts will continue to struggle with these lawsuits, the 
number of which is likely to grow given the recent success in Glatt.18
Moreover, unpaid interns will remain unsure about whether they are 
being illegally exploited as free labor, and employers will remain 
uncertain about the legality of their unpaid internship programs.19
Given the lack of response to other proposed solutions,20 a uniform
test adopted by the Supreme Court is the best option for allowing 
courts to consistently determine whether student interns are 
employees under the FLSA and for providing protections for 
students and employers across the nation. National consistency is 
especially important in the context of internships because the FLSA 
is a federal statute that should be interpreted similarly throughout the 
country, particularly since unpaid internships are common in large, 
these issues, see James J. LaRocca, Note, Lowery v. Klemm: A Failed Attempt at 
Providing Unpaid Interns and Volunteers with Adequate Employment Protections,
16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 131, 131 (2006).
14. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); see also Greenfield, supra note 3.
15. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
16. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kaplan v. Code Blue 
Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir.) (No. 13-179), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 618 (2013) (discussing the current circuit split and asking the Court to grant 
certiorari to resolve this split). 
17. The Court’s decision in Portland Terminal provided guidance regarding 
trainee situations; however, the Court did not apply a clear test, resulting in a circuit 
court split about how the FLSA should be interpreted. In other words, there is a 
significant question as to what test from Portland Terminal should be used in future 
cases and whether the decision from Portland Terminal applies to student interns at 
all. See discussion infra Part II.
18. See Greenfield, supra note 3. The court in Glatt also certified class 
action status, allowing even more unpaid interns to pursue remedies against 
internship sites for lack of compensation. Id. 
19. See Curiale, supra note 13, at 1546-48. 
20. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
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national corporations.21 The “primary benefit test,” adopted by the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits,22 supplemented by the factors 
outlined by the Department of Labor (DOL),23 would most readily 
align with Supreme Court precedent,24 would provide the greatest 
amount of deference to the DOL,25 and would most effectively 
protect students from illegal exploitation, employers from unwanted 
lawsuits, and courts from an influx of unnecessary cases brought by 
unpaid workers. 
Part I of this Note discusses the background and development 
of “internship law,” including the FLSA, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the FLSA, and the confusing introduction of Fact 
Sheet #71 in 2010. Part II describes the circuit split and outlines the 
different tests for interpreting the FLSA that have developed in the 
circuit courts. Part III analyzes this split and provides a detailed 
discussion of the benefits and detriments of each test. Finally, Part 
IV discusses why the adoption of a single test is important, suggests
a solution to the circuit split, and discusses how this test will solve 
the problems facing student interns today.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF “INTERNSHIP LAW”
When Congress adopted the FLSA in the early 1900s, it 
presumably did not contemplate the Act’s application to unpaid 
internships.26 This lack of consideration was likely a result of the low 
prevalence of unpaid internships in the early twentieth century 
compared to the number of internships in today’s workforce.27 One 
of the largest contributors to the increased prevalence of internships 
in today’s workforce was the economic downturn in 2008—
21. David C. Yamada, The Employment Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN.
L. REV. 215, 218 (2002).
22. See discussion infra Section II.B.
23. See discussion infra Section I.C (examining the DOL six-prong test 
outlined in Fact Sheet #71).
24. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
25. See infra note 84 (discussing the level of deference to be afforded to the 
DOL interpretation). 
26. Because the increase in unpaid internships is fairly recent, federal 
employment regulations do not directly address internships. See PERLIN, supra note 
8, at 65. Thus, many of the regulation problems with unpaid internships arise 
because courts continue to try to interpret internships based on outdated terms such 
as “apprenticeships,” “trainees,” and “independent contractors,” which have been 
extensively examined by the courts. See id. 
27. Id. at 30-36 (discussing the rise of internships from the early 1900s and 
the “explosion” in the 1980s and 1990s). 
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sometimes referred to as the “Great Recession”—which caused 
many employers to decrease the size of their workforce.28 This 
decrease, in turn, led to an increased number of unpaid interns to 
supplement the smaller number of employees working for pay in any 
particular industry.29
Criticized by some as exploitative, unfair, and available only to 
wealthy students,30 internships31 have been described by the National 
Association of Colleges and Employers (NACE) as “unique and 
valuable experiences for students both academically and in 
professional career preparation.”32 Many proponents of internships 
argue that internships give students an otherwise unobtainable foot in 
the door by allowing them to gain valuable work experience, 
network with professionals in their field, and build their resumes.33 In 
fact, in deciding whom to hire out of college, many employers look 
for internships or other outside-the-classroom experiences that 
28. Approximately 7.5 million jobs were lost as a result of the economic 
downturn, and the unemployment rate doubled to more than 10%. DAVID B.
GRUSKY, BRUCE WESTERN & CHRISTOPHER WIMER, THE GREAT RECESSION 4 (2011).
29. Bacon, supra note 7, at 69; see also Eve Tahmincioglu, Working for 
Free: The Boom in Adult Interns, TIME MAG. (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1977130,00.html.
30. See Eric M. Fink, No Money, Mo’ Problems: Why Unpaid Law Firm 
Internships Are Illegal and Unethical, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 435, 441 (2013) (arguing 
that unpaid internships at law firms are illegal and unethical and lawyers who 
provide these unpaid internships should be subject to lawyer discipline). 
31. For purposes of this Note, the term “internship” refers only to unpaid 
internships, but does not include paid internships or internships completed for class 
credit.
32. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, POSITION STATEMENT: UNPAID 
INTERNSHIPS (2010), available at https://www.naceweb.org/advocacy/position-
statements/unpaid-internships.aspx. Though there is not one generally accepted 
definition of “internship,” NACE has recommended that “internship” be defined as
a form of experiential learning that integrates knowledge and theory 
learned in the classroom with practical application and skills development 
in a professional setting. Internships give students the opportunity to gain 
valuable applied experience and make connections in professional fields 
they are considering for career paths; and give employers the opportunity 
to guide and evaluate talent.
NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, POSITION STATEMENT: U.S. INTERNSHIPS (2011),
available at http://www.naceweb.org/advocacy/position-statements/united-states-
internships.aspx.
33. Bacon, supra note 7, at 68 (“Individuals are aware of the importance of 
internships and seek to break into their fields via internships.”); Charles Westerberg 
& Carol Wickersham, Internships Have Value, Whether or Not Students Are Paid,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 24, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Internships-
Have-Value/127231/. 
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provide students with skills necessary to handle real-world 
situations.34 The importance of internships to today’s graduates 
combined with the economic benefits for businesses, especially in 
light of the recent economic downturn, has led to an increase in the 
number of internships,35 as well as an increase in significant issues 
regarding the classification of student interns under the FLSA.36
For instance, because it is unclear whether interns should be 
classified as employees or whether they fall outside of the FLSA’s 
purview, many employers with an interest in cutting costs gladly 
accept the opportunity to utilize free labor in their company.37 Before 
Glatt, no court had classified a student intern as an employee entitled 
to minimum wage or overtime compensation under the FLSA, so 
employers could proceed with numerous unpaid internships 
unhindered by the prospect of losing a lawsuit for not compensating 
their interns.38 While Glatt provided protections for one group of
student interns, as a district court case, it did not create far-reaching 
implications for students across the nation.39 Moreover, because so 
many employers require students to have internship experience to 
receive serious consideration for permanent employment, students 
are often compelled to take unpaid internships, as well as the 
financial hit, in order to stay competitive.40 In fact, one commentator, 
34. A 2010 survey of employers undertaken by the Association of 
American Colleges and Universities found that 79% of employers desired 
marketable skills that are best obtained outside a classroom, such as the “ability to 
apply knowledge and skills to real-world settings through internships or other hands-
on experiences.” HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., RAISING THE BAR: EMPLOYERS’ VIEWS 
ON COLLEGE LEARNING IN THE WAKE OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 9 (2010),
available at https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/files/LEAP/2009_Employer 
Survey.pdf; see also Joseph E. Aoun, Protect Unpaid Internships, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(July 13, 2010), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/07/13/aoun (noting that 
approximately 75% of employers prefer students with internship experience and 
over 90% prefer students with experience in their own organization). 
35. Bacon, supra note 7, at 68, 74. 
36. See id. at 75 (noting that criticisms of internship law increased as the 
number of internships increased because of the lack of protections for student interns 
and the issues with intern classification according to the traditional test). 
37. See PERLIN, supra note 8, at 63 (stating that “[e]ntire industries rely 
unabashedly on this source of free or cheap labor” partly because many people are 
unaware of or confused by the law). 
38. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
39. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013).
40. Jim Frederick, Internment Camp: The Intern Economy and the Culture 
Trust, BAFFLER, no. 9, 1997, available at https://www.thebaffler.com/past/ 
internment_camp. 
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using the example of an internship program at MTV, noted that one 
student working two days a week in a twelve-week internship loses 
approximately $2,742 over the course of the internship, while MTV 
saves $642,270 a year for all of the internships it oversees.41 Another 
scholar estimated that the total amount companies save through 
internships is approximately two billion dollars annually.42
This exploitation of workers is precisely what Congress sought 
to avoid when it adopted the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.43
However, the vague definitions provided in the Act have led to much 
confusion regarding the Act’s applicability to nontraditional workers, 
such as trainees.44 In recent years, officials have attempted to further 
tailor these protections to the growing number of unpaid interns with 
some difficulty due in large part to the lack of guidance from the 
Supreme Court.45
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act
In 1938, Congress enacted the FLSA as a response to the 
substandard treatment of employees during the Great Depression.46
Controversial at first, the FLSA was adopted to establish better 
working conditions and provide more protections for the average 
41. Id. According to this commentator, MTV “employs” approximately 150 
interns each semester for three semesters each year—a twenty-week spring 
semester, a twelve-week summer semester, and a twenty-week fall semester. Id. 
This data was calculated in 1997, when the federal minimum wage was $5.15 an 
hour. WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HISTORY OF FEDERAL MINIMUM 
WAGE RATES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2009), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm. Using the same numbers with the 2009 
minimum wage of $7.25 an hour, the results increase to $1,392 lost by a single 
student intern over a twelve-week period and $904,800 saved by the employer for all 
internships within a year. See id.
42. PERLIN, supra note 8, at 124 (using “up-to-date, but still conservative 
figures” of 500,000 interns at the 2010 minimum wage of $7.25 an hour). 
43. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 2(a)-(b), 52 
Stat. 1060, 1060 (discussing the policy behind adopting the Act as providing greater 
protections for the average worker); see also Bacon, supra note 7, at 70 (discussing 
Congress’s intent in adopting the FLSA). 
44. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947); see also 
infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
45. See Bacon, supra note 7, at 72, 74, 91. In fact, some small- and 
medium-sized businesses are hesitant to take on student interns because of a latent 
fear of getting suit for unintentionally violating the law. Id. at 91.
46. Fair Labor Standards Act § 2(a)-(b); see also Bacon, supra note 7, at 70 
(discussing the impetus for Congress’s creation of the FLSA). 
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worker.47 For instance, the greatest achievements of the FLSA were 
banning most forms of child labor and establishing minimum wage 
laws and maximum working hours.48 In fact, according to the 
Supreme Court, the overall purpose of the FLSA was to “insure that 
every person whose employment contemplated compensation should 
not be compelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed 
minimum wage.”49
Though the FLSA’s goal of protecting vulnerable employees
seemed clear enough, its vague definitions have led to major 
problems with consistently achieving this purpose.50 Under the 
FLSA, the term “‘[e]mploy’” is defined as “to suffer or permit to 
work.”51 Further, an “‘employee’” is defined as “any individual 
employed by an employer.”52 Unless a person is an “employee” 
under the FLSA, an employer is not required to provide minimum 
wage or overtime benefits.53 However, the definitions of “employee” 
and “employ” do little to indicate whether non-traditional workers, 
such as student interns, are entitled to minimum wage or overtime 
benefits, leading to a myriad of issues in classifying student workers 
under this statute.54
While the Act may be vague in some areas, in others, it is quite 
clear. For instance, in 1985, Congress amended the FLSA to provide 
an exception for individuals who volunteer their services at a 
government agency.55 According to this amendment, an “employee” 
does not include any person who volunteers to work for a public 
state agency, a subdivision of the state, or an interstate governmental 
agency if the person is not paid and is not employed by the public 
47. See PERLIN, supra note 8, at 65 (describing the FLSA’s goal as “the 
‘elimination of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum 
standards of living necessary for health, efficiency and well being of workers’”). 
48. Bacon, supra note 7, at 70.
49. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152. 
50. See Curiale, supra note 13, at 1539 (describing the definition of 
“‘employee’” under the FLSA as “‘the broadest definition that has ever been 
included in any one act’” (quoting United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 
n.3 (1945))).  
51. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012).
52. Id. § 203(e)(1).
53. Id. §§ 203(e)(1), 206, 207. 
54. Curiale, supra note 13, at 1539-40. 
55. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 4(a), 
99 Stat. 787, 790 (amending the Act to exclude public service volunteers); see also 
Anthony J. Tucci, Note, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL Should Apply 
the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1363, 1373 (2012) (discussing the amendment process of the FLSA). 
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agency.56 Thus, the term “employee” specifically excludes workers at 
public or government agencies because Congress exempted this class 
of people from FLSA protections by classifying them as volunteers.57
Additionally, though the FLSA provides no explicit exceptions for 
nonprofit agencies, except nonprofit food banks,58 unpaid workers at 
nonprofits are also generally exempt from FLSA coverage because 
they, too, are considered volunteers.59
Whether an individual is classified as an “employee” under the 
FLSA is determinative of whether he or she is entitled to 
compensation.60 Yet, the definitions in the Act provide little guidance 
and, in fact, often complicate the analysis because they are vague and 
misunderstood.61 Thus, in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., the 
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the application of the FLSA and
its vague definition of “employee.”62
B. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.
Almost ten years after the FLSA was enacted, the Supreme 
Court confronted the issue of whether the FLSA’s definition of 
employee included temporary trainees under consideration for
permanent employment.63 In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., the 
Portland Terminal Company instituted a preliminary training 
program to railroad trainees through which potential brakemen 
would participate to learn the requirements of the job.64 The program 
lasted seven to eight days, and the trainees were required to observe 
yard crew members and participate in tasks under close supervision 
before obtaining full-time employment.65 The training was a 
necessary component of the job given its important nature, and, as 
56. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A).
57. Id.; see also Tucci, supra note 55, at 1373; WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71, INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT (2010) [hereinafter FACT SHEET #71], available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. 
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5). 
59. See Bacon, supra note 7, at 72 (noting that “non-profit employers do not 
have to pay interns because they are classified as volunteers”); Tucci, supra note 55,
at 1370-72 (describing the FLSA exemption for nonprofit workers). 
60. See supra text accompanying note 53.
61. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
62. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 149 (1947).
63. Id. Interestingly, the Court noted, “Certiorari was granted because of the 
importance of the questions involved to the administration of the Act.” Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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reiterated by the Supreme Court, “[a]n applicant for such jobs [was] 
never accepted until he . . . had this preliminary training.”66
To determine whether the trainees were entitled to minimum 
wage or overtime compensation, the Court examined the definitions 
of employee and employ under the FLSA.67 The Court first noted 
that the Act did not intend for everyone who worked for their own 
benefit to receive compensation merely because they performed 
work for the employer.68 The Court applied several criteria to the 
trainees to determine which party received the benefit of the training: 
(1) whether the training was “practical” to receive a full-time 
position; (2) whether the trainees displaced regular employees who 
were necessary to supervise the trainees; (3) whether the trainees 
benefitted or hindered the progress of the work performed; (4) 
whether the trainees were guaranteed a position after the training; (5) 
whether the trainees expected to receive compensation for the 
training; and (6) whether the training was primarily for the benefit of 
the trainees.69 Concluding that the railroad received no “‘immediate 
advantage’” from the trainees, the Court held that the trainees were 
not employees under the FLSA and were not entitled to minimum 
wage.70
Portland Terminal is widely regarded as the seminal case for 
interpreting and applying the definitions of employee and employ in 
the FLSA.71 While the Court attempted to clarify the scope of the 
FLSA, the interpretation of employee since this decision has been 
66. Id. However, successful completion of the training program was not a 
guarantee of automatic employment, though it allowed the trainees’ names to be 
placed on a list of qualified workmen available when the railroad needed them. Id. at 
150. 
67. Id. at 152.
68. Id. This statement has generally become the basis of the primary benefit 
test, adopted by some circuits as the test for determining when a worker is an 
employee for FLSA purposes. See discussion infra Section II.B.
69. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 149-50, 153. The Court did not 
enumerate these criteria, nor did it specifically describe these criteria as “factors” to 
be used when determining whether a trainee is an “employee.” See Bacon, supra 
note 7, at 72-73 (outlining the six “factors” derived from Portland Terminal). 
70. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 153; see also supra note 68 and 
accompanying text.
71. See Bacon, supra note 7, at 73 (stating that “[i]t is widely accepted and 
unquestioned that Portland Terminal is the case from which the rules governing 
unpaid interns come”). 
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anything but clear or consistent.72 Though the Court has not yet 
addressed the FLSA’s application to unpaid internships, since the 
decision in Portland Terminal, the DOL has attempted to clarify the 
vague definition of employee on several occasions, most notably 
through the implementation of Fact Sheet #71.73
C. The Department of Labor’s Fact Sheet #71
Though Portland Terminal created a trainee exception by 
limiting the scope of the FLSA to cover only employees who worked 
for the benefit of the employer, uncertainties remained as to whether 
student interns could be classified as employees and if so, how they 
would be evaluated under the FLSA.74 To aid in this analysis, in 
2010, the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL released Fact Sheet 
#71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
help employers and courts determine whether student interns are 
entitled to minimum wage compensation and overtime benefits under 
the FLSA.75 The guidance provided in Fact Sheet #71 was similar to 
guidance previously provided by the DOL regarding trainees and 
other volunteer workers; however, it was the first time that the DOL 
had released a generalized statement regarding the classification of 
interns under the FLSA.76
Recognizing that the term employ was defined very broadly in 
the FLSA, the DOL created a six-prong test to assist employers in 
determining when a student intern at a for-profit agency is entitled to 
minimum wage and overtime compensation.77 The DOL noted that 
because the purpose of the FLSA was to protect vulnerable workers, 
the “exclusion from the definition of employment is necessarily quite 
72. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 9 (examining the 
circuit court split regarding the application of the FLSA to unpaid interns); see also 
discussion infra Part II (discussing the circuit court split). 
73. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
74. PERLIN, supra note 8, at 65-66. 
75. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57. The law governing the FLSA remained 
relatively static between Portland Terminal in 1947 and Fact Sheet #71 in 2010, 
despite changing circumstances. See Bacon, supra note 7, at 74-75. It is not clear 
why the DOL waited until 2010 to provide clarification of the FLSA, but some 
speculate that Fact Sheet #71 may have been issued as a result of increasing 
criticisms of the traditional test for classifying employees under the FLSA, 
particularly given the emerging prevalence of unpaid internships. Id. 
76. The DOL had previously provided individualized responses to employer 
inquiries about compliance with the FLSA. See infra note 86 and accompanying 
text.
77. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
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narrow,” and thus, most interns at for-profit agencies should receive 
compensation according to FLSA standards.78 The six elements that 
the DOL established in determining whether a student intern is an 
employee are 
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities 
of the employer, is similar to training which would be given in an 
educational environment; 2. The internship experience is for the benefit of 
the intern; 3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works 
under close supervision of existing staff; 4. The employer that provides the 
training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the intern; 
and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; 5. The intern is 
not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and 6. 
The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to 
wages for the time spent in the internship.79
The DOL further stated that “[i]f all of the factors listed above are 
met, an employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA, and 
the Act’s minimum wage and overtime provisions do not apply to the 
intern.”80 Thus, the DOL believed that these six elements would 
allow employers to recognize whether an employment relationship 
had been created with student interns such that the students were 
entitled to minimum wage and overtime under the FLSA.81
Fact Sheet #71 was supposed to bolster the decision in 
Portland Terminal and provide a more readily understandable and 
uniform interpretation for classifying interns under the FLSA;82
however, many courts continue to struggle with consistently 
interpreting the definition of employee in the FLSA.83 While Fact 
Sheet #71 provides guidance on the difficult issue of employee 
classification under the FLSA, as an opinion letter from the DOL, it
is not binding law.84 Further, although it has been described as a 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. 
82. Bacon, supra note 7, at 76 (suggesting that the DOL factors were 
implemented because of criticism of the guidelines for interpreting the FLSA and 
because of a lack of protection for unpaid interns). 
83. See discussion infra Part II.  
84. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that 
“the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance”). In addition to disagreeing about the interpretation of the FLSA, 
courts have also disagreed about the level of deference to give the DOL Fact Sheet. 
Compare Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 
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logical extension of Portland Terminal,85 some critics argue that it 
actually creates more confusion because the DOL suggests two 
different tests and does not clarify which test should control.86 As the 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of how student interns 
should be classified under the FLSA, lower courts have taken matters 
into their own hands and have achieved vastly different results due to 
a lack of guidance.87
II. HOW THE COURTS HAVE ATTEMPTED (AND FAILED) TO 
CONSISTENTLY CLASSIFY EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FLSA
Though Portland Terminal helped to clarify the definition of 
employee under the FLSA, and Fact Sheet #71 provided some 
helpful guidance as well, federal courts have still struggled to 
consistently interpret the FLSA, resulting in confusion as to the 
precise test to be used for classifying student interns.88 For instance, 
the Tenth Circuit and lower courts in the Second Circuit utilize a 
2011) (reasoning that the DOL Fact Sheet #71 should not be given deference under 
Skidmore), with Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (affording deference to the Fact Sheet). For instance, some courts 
have given it great deference according to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (creating a two-step 
test that affords deference to Congress if it has spoken directly to the issue in 
question). By contrast, others have given it little or no deference based on Skidmore.
323 U.S. at 140 (creating a “power-to-persuade” test that gives agencies the 
opportunity to persuade courts to give them deference). However, given that Fact 
Sheet #71 is not entitled to the same binding force as a regulation, the decision in 
Christensen v. Harris County suggests that Fact Sheet #71 is “‘entitled to respect’” 
under the Skidmore test but is not entitled to Chevron deference. Christensen v. 
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140) 
(holding that a DOL opinion letter was entitled only to Skidmore deference).
85. See Bacon, supra note 7, at 75. 
86. The DOL stated both that “[t]he determination of whether an internship 
or training program meets this exclusion depends upon all of the facts and 
circumstances of each such program,” suggesting a totality of the circumstances test, 
and also that all the factors listed must be met, suggesting the use of an “all-or-
nothing” approach. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57. Moreover, from 1994 to 1996, 
in a series of responses to employers’ inquiries about the legality of their internships, 
the DOL suggested the same six factors as a method for determining whether interns 
are employees under the FLSA. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 233-34. However, it 
is unclear whether the approach suggested by the DOL in these letters used an “all-
or-nothing” method or a “totality of the circumstances” method. See id. at 233.
87. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 14-21 (discussing 
the current circuit split regarding the classification of student interns under the 
FLSA); see also discussion infra Part II (outlining the circuit split).
88. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 9.
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totality of the circumstances test for interpreting the FLSA, which 
balances all the factors surrounding the working relationship to 
determine whether the worker is an employee.89 By contrast, the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits utilize a “primary benefit” test, 
which examines which party receives the primary benefit of the 
working relationship.90 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has shown 
support for the “economic reality” test, which examines whether the 
worker relies on the employer to obtain an economic benefit.91
Though not all of these circuits have yet attempted to classify student 
interns according to the FLSA, several of the circuits have applied 
the FLSA to other types of working relationships—most notably 
trainees, vocational student workers, and independent contractors.92
While differences exist between these types of relationships,93 the
tests used to classify each of these categories of workers contribute 
to the circuit split by demonstrating how the circuits interpret the 
FLSA definition of “employee.” Further, while the tests overlap in 
some aspects, there are obvious distinctions in the way the FLSA is 
interpreted under each test, which often leads to considerably 
different results.94
A. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
In determining whether an individual is an employee under the 
FLSA, some courts have taken a holistic analysis by utilizing a 
89. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
90. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
91. The economic reality test had previously been applied only in the 
context of independent contractors; however, in Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing, Inc.,
the Eleventh Circuit expanded its application by applying this test to student interns. 
See discussion infra Section II.C.
92. See, e.g., Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (11th 
Cir. 2013) (applying the FLSA to independent contractors); Solis v. Laurelbrook 
Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying the FLSA to 
vocational student workers); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (applying the FLSA to snack food distribution trainees).
93. For instance, vocational student workers generally spend class time and 
training time learning skills for a particular trade. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 520. 
Independent contractors, on the other hand, are generally full-time workers who 
generate business by seeking out general contractors. See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 
1314-15. 
94. Yamada, supra note 21, at 233 (stating that “[t]he difference in results 
can be a potentially significant one”). 
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totality of the circumstances test.95 A totality of the circumstances 
test examines all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
working relationship.96 Most significantly, the Tenth Circuit has 
championed this approach to interpreting the FLSA for several 
years.97 Recently, however, lower courts in other circuits, namely the 
Second Circuit, have relied on this test specifically for classifying 
student interns.98
1. The Tenth Circuit
In 1993, in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, the Tenth 
Circuit adopted the totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether firefighter trainees were employees during their training 
time at the academy.99 To become members of the firefighter force, 
trainees were required to attend the academy, although they 
understood that they would not be compensated for their 
attendance.100 Those who successfully completed training were 
entitled to permanent employment with the force.101 Utilizing a six-
factor test provided by the DOL to interpret the FLSA,102 the court 
explicitly rejected an all-or-nothing application of the six factors, 
acknowledging that the DOL factors were important but not 
95. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
96. Reich, 992 F.2d at 1027.
97. See id. (applying the totality of the circumstances test to firefighter 
trainees). 
98. See discussion infra Subsection II.A.2.
99. Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026-27 (discussing how training lasted 
approximately ten weeks and included classroom instruction, fire simulations, and 
demonstrations). 
100. Id. at 1029. 
101. Id. 
102. The factors provided by the DOL at this time were nearly identical to 
those provided by the DOL in 2010. The factors stated: 
[(1) t]he training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities 
of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational 
school[; (2) t]he training is for the benefit of the trainee[; (3) t]he trainees 
do not displace regular employees, but work under close observation[; (4) 
t]he employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage 
from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may 
actually be impeded[; (5) t]he trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job 
at the completion of the training period[; and, (6) t]he employer and the 
trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time 
spent in training.
Id. at 1026 (citation omitted). 
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determinative in analyzing whether the trainees were employees.103
Instead, the court reasoned that a strict application of all the factors 
was not supported by the Court’s decision in Portland Terminal
because the Court had stated that a consideration of the situation as a 
whole, rather than specific factors, controlled.104 Ultimately, the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that the firefighter trainees were not 
employees under the FLSA because five of the six factors weighed in 
favor of the employers, and thus, they were not entitled to minimum 
wage or overtime compensation.105
2. Lower Courts in the Second Circuit
More recently, district courts in the Second Circuit have also 
applied the totality of the circumstances test.106 While the Second 
Circuit has yet to review these lower court decisions,107 the district 
courts in this circuit have recognized the utility of the totality of the 
circumstances test and have specifically applied it in unpaid 
internship situations.108 Though the district courts have reached 
different conclusions in applying the totality of the circumstances 
test based on the factual circumstances of each case, the district 
courts’ willingness to apply this test in several unpaid intern cases 
suggests strong support for this test in the Second Circuit.109
103. Id. at 1027 (stating that the factors were “relevant but not conclusive to 
the determination of whether these firefighter trainees were employees under the 
FLSA”).
104. Id. at 1026-27.
105. The only factor that weighed in favor of the trainees was that the 
trainees expected employment at the completion of the training; however, the court 
noted that this single factor was not dispositive of an employment relationship. Id. at 
1029.
106. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 525 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
107. In September 2013, the Second Circuit granted appeal to Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. based on the decision in Glatt, but the Second Circuit has 
not yet reviewed this decision. See generally Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 
No. 11 Civ. 6784(WHP), 2013 WL 5405696 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (granting the 
motion to certify appeal).
108. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 521-22; Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 490.
109. In fact, the Second Circuit utilized the totality of the circumstances test 
just a year prior to the decisions in Glatt and Wang when examining whether an 
employment relationship existed in a domestic service worker situation. Velez v. 
Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 328 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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a. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc.
As previously discussed, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. 
involved two unpaid student workers on the set of the Black Swan 
movie.110 These interns worked five days a week for a total of forty 
to fifty hours, performing tasks such as getting payroll checks, 
running errands, and overseeing invoices.111 To determine whether 
these students should have received compensation for their work, the 
court applied the totality of the circumstances test.112 Specifically 
rejecting the primary benefit test adopted by other circuits,113 the 
Southern District of New York held that the DOL factors should be 
given significant deference and analyzed according to all the 
surrounding circumstances.114 The court stated that this test provided 
the most logical interpretation and the narrowest application of the 
“trainee exception” adopted by the Court in Portland Terminal.115
The court also reasoned that the internship was not structured any 
differently than a typical employee relationship, particularly because 
the interns were performing menial tasks that had little to no 
educational benefit.116 Ultimately, the court held that, according to 
the totality of the circumstances, the student interns were employees
under the FLSA.117
b. Wang v. Hearst Corp. 
In the same year, the Southern District of New York examined 
another case similar to Glatt.118 In Wang v. Hearst Corp., the court 
again applied the totality of the circumstances test, but this time it 
reached the opposite conclusion, denying the unpaid students’ 
110. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 522; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
112. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 525.
113. See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing the primary benefit test 
used by other circuit courts). 
114. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.
115. However, the district court in Glatt distinguished the decision from that 
in Portland Terminal by noting that the trainees in that case hindered the business of 
the employer and worked for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the 
employer. Id. at 534.
116. The court also acknowledged that the employer received the advantage 
from the working relationship, and any benefit gained by the interns was merely the 
result of working as an employee would work, not because the internship was 
designed to provide such a benefit. Id. at 533. 
117. Id. at 534. 
118. Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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motion for summary judgment on the claim that they should have 
been classified as employees under the FLSA.119 Wang involved 
student interns who worked for magazines owned by the Hearst 
Corporation.120 The students performed a number of tasks, including 
conducting online research, editing and fact-checking articles, and 
helping to prepare for events.121 At the outset of the internship, the 
Hearst Corporation instructed the interns to provide “school credit 
letters” evidencing the college credit earned for the internship.122
Again rejecting the primary benefit test,123 the court reasoned that it 
was impractical “that the presence of an ‘immediate advantage’
alone [could create] an employment relationship.”124 Here, the court 
noted that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether an 
employment relationship had been created because there was 
evidence of an educational benefit for the interns and obstruction of 
the employer’s normal business operations.125 As such, Wang can be
distinguished from Glatt where the interns were expected to perform 
uncompensated, low-level work with little educational benefit.126
While Wang and Glatt do not directly contribute to the circuit split, 
these decisions show that lower courts in the Second Circuit have 
considered the advantage of the totality of the circumstances test, 
which was traditionally applied in trainee situations, for classifying 
unpaid interns under the FLSA.127
119. The court noted that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding 
three of the DOL factors used to determine whether these interns were employees 
under the FLSA. Id. at 494. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 491-92. 
122. Id. at 491. Though many employers believe college credit can immunize 
them from lawsuits based on violations of the FLSA, some courts have held that 
academic credit provided by the school bears little or no determination on whether 
interns are employees under the FLSA. See, e.g., Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 537. 
123. See discussion infra Section II.B.
124. Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493 (refusing to adopt the primary benefit test to 
analyze whether a student intern is an employee under the FLSA).  
125. Id. at 494. 
126. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533. 
127. See supra note 108 (discussing the significance of these district court 
cases). 
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B. The “Primary Benefit” Test
By contrast, several circuits apply the “primary benefit” test to
determine when a worker is an employee under the FLSA.128 The 
primary benefit test focuses on the benefits flowing to each party and
ultimately examines whether the employer or the worker receives the 
primary benefit of the working relationship.129 Under this test, if the 
employer receives the primary benefit, the worker is an employee
under the FLSA; however, if the worker receives the primary benefit, 
the worker is not entitled to FLSA protections.130 Though the primary 
benefit test has yet to be applied specifically to unpaid interns in a 
higher educational setting, the Sixth Circuit has applied this test to 
student workers in a vocational school.131 The similarities between 
student interns in an internship setting and student workers in a 
vocational school suggest that the same test would be applicable in 
cases involving unpaid interns.132
1. The Sixth Circuit 
To date, the Sixth Circuit has conducted one of the most 
thorough inquiries into the primary benefit test’s application to 
students. In Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc., the Sixth 
Circuit examined whether high school students who spent a half day 
128. See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 
(6th Cir. 2011) (applying the primary benefit test to vocational students in the Sixth 
Circuit); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying the 
primary benefit test to snack food distribution trainees in the Fourth Circuit); Atkins 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying the primary 
benefit test to manufacturer trainees in the Fifth Circuit); Donovan v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the primary benefit test to flight 
attendant trainees in the Fifth Circuit). 
129. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 526.
130. The reasoning behind the primary benefit test is that workers who 
receive an educational benefit have already been “compensated” through the 
education they gained, while those who obtain no educational benefit should be 
compensated monetarily. See id. at 528. 
131. Id. at 529.
132. For instance, both vocational schools and internships provide students 
with practical skills needed to perform certain jobs. See Carl D. Perkins Vocational 
Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-524, § 521(31), 98 Stat. 2435, 2486 (1984) 
(explaining the purpose of vocational schools, which is to provide hands-on training 
in a particular trade or industry). Though vocational schools are often tailored 
directly to one specific trade, both vocational schools and internships involve some 
component of educating students regarding the appropriate knowledge and skills that 
will make the students marketable to future employers. Id. 
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in class and a half day learning practical skills were entitled to 
minimum wage under the FLSA.133 Recognizing the vagueness in the 
FLSA’s definition of employee and the circuit court split, the court 
examined which test was appropriate under Portland Terminal and 
the DOL interpretations of the FLSA.134
The court first acknowledged the Supreme Court’s previous use 
of the economic reality test in situations involving independent 
contractors.135 The court quickly dismissed this test as a basis for 
determining whether the students were employees because “[t]o state 
that economic realities govern is no more helpful than attempting to 
determine employment status by reference directly to the FLSA’s
definitions themselves.”136 In other words, the court stated that the 
economic reality test provided no definitive test or factors to apply,
but merely stated a conclusion that was unhelpful in an actual case.137
The court then rejected the DOL factors as the sole basis for 
determining whether an employment relationship existed for the 
students.138 The court concluded that the six-factor test was “overly 
rigid” and inconsistent with Portland Terminal because under the all-
or-nothing approach, the absence of one factor was determinative to 
the outcome.139 Instead, the court found that the primary benefit test 
most closely aligned with Portland Terminal because it was 
appropriately narrow in scope and focused on the benefits afforded 
to the students through the work they performed.140 The Sixth Circuit 
also noted that although the primary benefit was the ultimate basis of 
the Court’s decision in Portland Terminal, other factors could be 
considered, such as whether the students displaced other employees 
or whether an educational benefit existed for the student.141
133. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 520. 
134. Id. at 522-23. The court specifically stated, “There is no settled test for 
determining whether a student is an employee for purposes of the FLSA.” Id. at 521. 
135. Id. at 522; see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 
U.S. 290, 301 (1985); discussion infra Section II.C (discussing the Eleventh 
Circuit’s application of the economic reality test).
136. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 522-23. 
137. Id. at 523. 
138. Id. at 525 (“We find the WHD’s test to be a poor method for 
determining employee status in a training or educational setting.”). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 526. 
141. Id. at 526, 529. However, others have argued that the primary benefit 
test was not the basis of the Court’s decision in Portland Terminal, but rather, it was 
a six-factor test similar to the DOL’s six-factor test. See Bacon, supra note 7, at 73 
(noting that an intern can be exempted from the FLSA’s requirements only if the six 
factors laid out in Portland Terminal are met). 
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Ultimately, the court held that the students were not employees
covered by the FLSA because the students received the primary 
benefit of the work, thus precluding them from receiving 
compensation for the work performed during their practical 
training.142
2. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has applied a comparable, though less 
extensive, test than the one applied by the Sixth Circuit in 
Laurelbrook.143 In McLaughlin v. Ensley, the Fourth Circuit also 
applied the primary benefit test, concluding that snack food 
distribution trainees were employees under the FLSA because they 
did not receive the primary benefit of the training.144 Specifically, 
because the training period lasted only one week and the skills of 
stocking and repairing vending machines and completing paperwork 
were menial, the court concluded that the primary benefit flowed to 
the employer, thus entitling the trainees to minimum wage during 
their training period.145
3. The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit has also recognized the importance of the 
primary benefit test.146 In Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., the 
court examined the applicability of the FLSA to flight attendant 
trainees.147 These trainees were required to attend a training session 
to become employees for American Airlines; however, successful 
completion of the training did not guarantee a permanent position, 
and the trainees were not paid during the training time.148
142. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 532. 
143. See McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989).
144. Id. The trainees in this case were required to participate in a week-long 
training period that consisted of fifty to sixty hours of work where the trainees 
would ride along with an experienced distribution employee and assist with the daily 
tasks in order to learn the requirements of the job. Id. at 1208. 
145. Id. at 1210. Additionally, the trainees were not entitled to a job upon 
completion of the training. Id. at 1208. 
146. See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(affirming the district court’s reliance on a form of the primary benefit test and 
stating that the district court’s finding that the trainees gained the greater benefit of 
the working relationship was supported by the evidence).  
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 269.
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Additionally, American Airlines provided food and housing to the 
trainees for the duration of the training period.149 The court examined 
the relationship and determined that the training was given at great 
cost to the employer, regular employees were not displaced by the 
trainees, and the trainees were able to obtain employment that they 
otherwise would have been unable to obtain.150 Thus, the primary 
benefit flowed to the trainees rather than the employer, resulting in 
the trainees not being classified as employees.151
One year later in Atkins v. General Motors, the Fifth Circuit 
again applied the primary benefit test to examine whether automobile 
manufacturer trainees were employees under the FLSA.152 These 
trainees attended training classes and performed hands-on training by 
cleaning and repairing obsolete machines to learn how to repair and 
assemble vital equipment.153 The trainees understood that they were 
not guaranteed a job at the conclusion of the training and that they 
would not be paid for their training.154 The court concluded that the 
trainees performed virtually no work that benefitted the employer 
and in fact, actually damaged or incorrectly repaired equipment on 
some occasions during their training.155 Therefore, any work 
undertaken by the trainees that benefitted the employer was of such 
minimal value that the trainees could not be properly classified as
employees.156 While the Fifth Circuit has not applied this test directly 
to unpaid student interns, the application to trainees suggests that the 
primary benefit test would also be applied to student interns because 
of the court’s consistency in using the primary benefit test to 
interpret the FLSA.157
149. Though not all trainees took advantage of this offer, the offer itself is 
relevant to the analysis by showing that the employers incurred expenses in 
providing this training to potential employees. Id. 
150. The court here also acknowledged the importance of the DOL’s 
interpretation of Portland Terminal and subsequently applied all of the DOL factors 
as additional support. Id. at 273.
151. Id. 
152. Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1983).
153. Id. at 1127. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 1128. Again, in this case, the court cited the DOL factors with 
approval, though the ultimate analysis turned on which party received the primary 
benefit of the work. Id. at 1127-28. 
156. Id. at 1129. 
157. See, e.g., id. at 1127 (relying on the primary benefit test); Donovan v. 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) (using the primary benefit test 
to interpret the FLSA). 
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C. The “Economic Reality” Test 
In 2013, the Eleventh Circuit intensified the already existent 
circuit split by applying the “economic reality” test to student 
interns.158 The Eleventh Circuit had previously utilized the economic 
reality test to determine whether other types of workers were 
employees under the FLSA159 by relying on Supreme Court 
precedent.160 For instance, in Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc.,
in determining whether five patients who performed assorted 
kitchen, maid, and waitress tasks at a retirement center were 
employees under the FLSA, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “It is well-
established that the issue of whether an employment relationship 
exists under the FLSA must be judged by the ‘economic realities’ of 
the individual case.”161
The court further defined and expanded this test in Scantland v. 
Jeffry Knight, Inc. when it laid out six factors to follow when 
applying this test to independent contractors.162 The six factors were 
as follows: 
(1) [T]he nature and degree of the alleged employer’s control as to the 
manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee’s
opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; (3) the 
alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his 
task, or his employment of workers; (4) whether the service rendered 
requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanency and duration of the 
158. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834 
(11th Cir. 2013).
159. See Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 470 (11th Cir. 
1982).
160. In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, the Supreme 
Court used the “economic reality” test to determine whether individuals who had 
volunteered for a nonprofit religious organization were employees under the FLSA. 
471 U.S. 290, 292, 301-02 (1985). However, the Supreme Court’s application of the 
“economic reality” test was generally applied only to independent contractors and 
had not previously been applied to internships until the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in 2013. See Curiale, supra note 13, at 1543; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 16, at 14. 
161. New Floridian Hotel, 676 F.2d at 470 (quoting Weisel v. Singapore 
Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1979)). The employees in this 
case were compensated through room and board, and received amounts woefully 
below the minimum wage standard, such as $0.17 to $0.55 per hour. Though the 
hotel chain argued that the former patients were only given work to keep them busy, 
not to create an employment relationship, the court held that the patients performed 
the work of employees and were entitled to compensation. Id. at 470-71.
162. Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2013).
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working relationship; (6) the extent to which the service rendered is an
integral part of the alleged employer’s business.163
Further, the court stated that the overall focus of the economic reality 
test is the economic dependence of the independent contractor.164 In 
other words, whether the contractor is dependent on finding business 
through other people or is in business for himself or herself is the 
central focus of the analysis.165
However, in 2013, the Eleventh Circuit expanded this test 
outside of the independent contractor context in Kaplan v. Code Blue 
Billing & Coding, Inc.166 In that case, the court applied the economic 
reality test to unpaid interns who worked for a coding and billing 
company to receive academic credit toward graduation from 
college.167 Though it did not specifically apply the six factors laid out 
in Scantland, the court examined the economic reality of the working 
relationship, ultimately concluding that the plaintiffs were not 
employees under the FLSA because the employer received little 
economic benefit from the work and the students received 
educational benefits, such as academic credit, from participation in 
the internship.168 This test has not been adopted by any other court in 
the context of unpaid internships, though it has been widely applied 
in independent contractor situations.169
III. WHICH COURT HAS IT RIGHT?: ANALYZING THE COMPETING 
TESTS
Though the tests applied by the circuit courts overlap in some 
aspects, there are distinct differences in the application and results of 
163. Id. The court derived these factors by combining factors used in two 
different cases; however, most other applications of the economic reality test do not 
rely on a specific set of factors. Id. at 1312 n.2. 
164. Id. at 1312. 
165. Id. (concluding that “‘the final and determinative question must be 
whether the total of the testing establishes the personnel are so dependent upon the 
business with which they are connected that they come within the protection of 
FLSA or are sufficiently independent to lie outside its ambit’” (quoting Usery v. 
Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (5th Cir. 1976))). 
166. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834-35
(11th Cir. 2013).
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 834. Though the court referred to this as an economic reality test, 
it seems more indicative of a primary benefit test, demonstrating the difficulty in 
applying this test. See infra Section III.C. 
169. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 
(1947); Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1311; Pilgrim Equip., 527 F.2d at 1311-12.
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each test.170 For instance, the totality of the circumstances test and 
the primary benefit test both allow for some flexibility in their 
application; however, the totality of the circumstances test examines 
all of the surrounding factors, which could lead to a much more 
time-consuming analysis than the primary benefit test.171 Overall, 
each test has some positive and negative aspects, and all of the tests
have been critiqued by courts, attorneys, and academic scholars.172
A. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
The totality of the circumstances test, which has been adopted 
by the Tenth Circuit and district courts in the Second Circuit, has 
been praised by courts for its flexibility because it allows each 
internship to be examined on a case-by-case basis.173 Unlike the all-
or-nothing approach advocated by the DOL, under the totality of the 
circumstances approach, the presence or absence of one factor is not 
determinative to classification as an “employee,” allowing courts to 
tailor the inquiry to the specific working relationship.174 For instance, 
in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, in holding for the 
employers, the Tenth Circuit determined that although only five of 
the six factors favored the employer, a “single factor cannot carry the 
entire weight of an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances.”175
Because of this flexibility, the totality of the circumstances approach 
can be used to protect both employers, as it did in Parker Fire,176 and 
170. Additionally, each test also attempts to defer to the intention of the 
parties by considering whether the intern or the employer should receive more legal 
protection. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the circuit court split). 
171. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
172. See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 
(6th Cir. 2011) (critiquing the six factors laid out by the DOL); Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (criticizing the 
primary benefit test); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 16-17
(critiquing the use of the economic reality test); PERLIN, supra note 8, at 67 
(critiquing the totality of the circumstances test). 
173. See, e.g., Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141-
42 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]his court has treated employment for FLSA purposes as a 
flexible concept to be determined on a case-by-case basis by review of the totality of 
the circumstances.”).
174. See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 
1993) (stating that “a true ‘totality of the circumstances’ test . . . should not turn on 
the presence or absence of one factor in the equation”). 
175. Id. at 1029.
176. Id. 
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students, as it did in Glatt,177 depending on the unique circumstances 
of each internship.  
Likewise, the totality of the circumstances test has support in 
the DOL factors.178 In Fact Sheet #71, the DOL stated that “[t]he 
determination of whether an internship or training program meets 
this exclusion depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of 
each such program,” advocating for a totality of the circumstances 
approach.179 Moreover, it can also be argued that this test has support 
in Portland Terminal.180 According to the Southern District of New 
York, the Court used several factors surrounding the work 
relationship to examine trainee classification under the FLSA.181
Though the Court never explicitly mentioned the totality of the 
circumstances test, it is reasonable to conclude, based on subsequent 
interpretations of the Court’s opinion, that this test has support in 
Portland Terminal.182
Paradoxically, this test can also be interpreted as inconsistent 
with the DOL’s interpretation of the FLSA, which requires that all
six factors be met for an employment relationship to exist.183
According to some views, because the DOL is the agency charged 
with interpreting the FLSA and its interpretation in Fact Sheet #71 is 
well-reasoned, it should be entitled to deference.184 Thus, one major 
weakness of the totality of the circumstances test is that it ignores the 
DOL’s statement that all six factors should be present to avoid 
creating a broad exception to the status of an “employee.”185
177. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 534.
178. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57; see also supra note 86 (discussing 
how the DOL Fact Sheet has created confusion regarding which test should be 
applied). 
179. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
180. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.
181. According to the court, these factors were ultimately used by the DOL 
to create Fact Sheet #71. Id. at 531-32.
182. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 149-50 (1947).
183. This inconsistency in Fact Sheet #71 is one of the causes for confusion 
in classifying student interns in the first place. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57; see 
also discussion supra Section I.C.
184. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532. However, other courts note that because 
the DOL Fact Sheet is merely an opinion letter promulgated by a federal agency and 
is not binding law, it should not be entitled to much, if any, deference. For instance, 
the Sixth Circuit did not give the DOL’s test in Fact Sheet #71 deference under the 
Skidmore test. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th 
Cir. 2011).
185. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
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Moreover, one scholar notes that “under the totality of 
circumstances approach, a trier of fact must engage in an extensive, 
drawn-out factor analysis that, by necessity, requires a great deal of 
subjective judgment . . . [that] virtually ensures inconsistent 
results.”186 As a result of this subjectivity, it is nearly impossible for 
employers to know before taking on an intern whether an 
employment relationship will exist.187 Thus, under the totality of the 
circumstances test, employers cannot ensure compliance with the 
FLSA because the determination of whether a student is an employee
is subjective based on circumstances that the employer may not 
know at the outset of the relationship, such as the amount of learning 
that will take place throughout the internship and the court’s 
determination of which factors should be given the most weight.188
Overall, the totality of the circumstances test allows for flexibility 
and is deferential to the DOL factors; however, it also creates 
subjectivity and, as a result, can be difficult to apply.
B. The Primary Benefit Test
Similar to the totality of the circumstances test, one of the 
greatest strengths of the primary benefit test is its flexibility because 
no one factor is dispositive to the inquiry.189 For instance, in 
Laurelbrook, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that a pivotal aspect of 
the primary benefit test is the balance between the employer’s and 
student’s benefits derived from the relationship.190 Because the 
primary benefit test focuses on weighing the entire relationship, 
rather than a specific list of factors or elements, it is flexible enough 
to allow courts to consider the unique nature of each working 
relationship.191 This flexibility allows decisions regarding employee 
status to be based on the individual student and situation, thus 
186. Yamada, supra note 21, at 233.
187. See id. (discussing the subjectivity of the totality of the circumstances 
test).
188. See id.
189. In Laurelbrook, although the court’s ultimate analysis rested on a 
primary benefit test, the court also looked at the totality of the circumstances to 
determine which party received the primary benefit of the relationship. 642 F.3d at 
529.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 525 (discussing the rigidity of the all-or-nothing approach 
compared to the primary benefit test).
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providing fairer outcomes and more protections for each student 
intern.192
Moreover, because the nature of the primary benefit test is such 
that it relies on whether the primary benefit flows to the student or 
the employer, unlike the totality of the circumstances test, employers 
can take steps throughout the internship to ensure that the benefit is 
flowing to the student.193 For instance, these steps could include
providing regular educational training prior to the intern performing 
a given task, scheduling regular progress evaluations, or allowing the 
student to shadow the employer to gain valuable insight into 
company procedures that would not otherwise be available to paid 
employees.194 These steps would not only benefit students by 
ensuring that they, rather than the employer, receive the primary 
benefit of their unpaid work, but it would also protect employers 
from unanticipated lawsuits for a lack of compliance with the 
FLSA.195 In other words, if employers retain control over who 
benefits from the internship, they can be sure at the beginning and 
throughout the duration of the working relationship that the 
internship complies with the FLSA.196 On the other hand, if the 
employer wants to hire students to complete menial, non-educational 
tasks, students will still receive protections under this test by being 
classified as an “employee,” requiring compensation of at least 
minimum wage.197
The primary benefit test also has support in Portland 
Terminal.198 In that case, the Court found for the employers only 
192. Id. at 529 (“The [primary benefit] test is pitched at an appropriate level 
of generality to enable it to reach non-employer-based training relationships, such as 
those provided in schools, and can take into consideration the unique nature of the 
training situation presented here.”).
193. See KATHRYN ANNE EDWARDS & ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ,
ECON. POLICY INST., POLICY MEMO NO. 160, NOT-SO-EQUAL PROTECTION:
REFORMING THE REGULATION OF STUDENT INTERNSHIPS (2010), available at 
http://s1.epi.org/files/page/-/pdf/epi_pm_160.pdf.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 4-5 (providing two examples of how employers could 
calculate the benefits and costs to their company by educating students through 
internships).
196. See id.
197. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (outlining the minimum wage provision in 
the FLSA).
198. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 18. But see Glatt v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The 
Supreme Court did not weigh the benefits to the trainees against those of the 
railroad, but relied on findings that the training program served only the trainees’ 
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after concluding that the Portland Terminal Company received no 
“immediate advantage” from the trainees’ work.199 Under the Court’s 
reasoning, if an employer provides aid and instruction to a student 
intern, but the student gains the benefit of the work, the student is not 
an employee under the FLSA.200 In other words, the Court 
acknowledged that as broad as the definition of employee may be, it 
“cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves 
only his own interest an employee of another person who gives him 
aid and instruction.”201 Just as Portland Terminal examined whether 
the “immediate advantage” flowed to the employers or the trainees,
the primary benefit test also examines whether the benefit flows to 
the student intern or the employer.202
The primary benefit test is not, however, without its 
weaknesses. For instance, one court criticized the primary benefit 
test as “subjective and unpredictable” because it could allow students 
at the same internship to be classified differently under the FLSA 
depending on how much each student learned from the internship.203
In other words, if one of the students in Glatt had gained educational 
value through training, shadowing, or hands-on learning experience 
on the Black Swan set while the other had merely performed menial 
jobs such as taking lunch orders and getting coffee, the former 
student would be properly classified as an intern while the latter 
might be considered an employee.204 Thus, a student’s classification 
under the FLSA could be very unpredictable depending on how 
much value each student gained from the internship.205
Moreover, it is incredibly difficult to quantify which party 
receives the primary benefit of an internship experience.206 For 
instance, one scholar questions, “Can you balance out thirty hours of 
interests and that the employer received ‘no “immediate advantage” from any work 
done by the trainees.’” (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 
153 (1947)).
199. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 153.
200. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525, 529 
(6th Cir. 2011).
201. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152.
202. See id. at 153; see also Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 529 (discussing how 
Portland Terminal applied a form of the primary benefit test to classify the trainees 
in question).
203. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.
204. See id. (discussing how two students in the same internship could be 
classified differently under the primary benefit test).
205. Id.
206. See PERLIN, supra note 8, at 67.
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data entry with thirty minutes of database training or a brief powwow 
with executives? Is it vocational training to learn by osmosis, from 
being cc’d on emails or by sitting in on staff meetings?”207 Stated 
differently, the work accomplished by interns and the amount of 
learning that takes place is often difficult to quantify, making it even 
more difficult to weigh the benefits to determine which party 
received the primary benefit.208 By and large, despite being difficult 
to quantify and unpredictable in some circumstances, the primary 
benefit test provides flexibility, certainty for employers, and 
deference to Portland Terminal.
C. The Economic Reality Test
As with the two preceding tests, the economic reality test also 
has positive and negative attributes. The strongest argument in 
support of the economic reality test is the explicit wording for this 
test used by the Supreme Court in Tony & Susan Alamo 
Foundation.209 In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he test 
of employment under the [FLSA] is one of ‘economic reality.’”210
Though the Court did not further define the economic reality test, the 
language alone provides support for the application of the economic 
reality test in all FLSA employment contexts.211 Further, even courts 
that have applied other tests to internship contexts have recognized 
that the ultimate test is one of economic reality.212
207. Id. While this scholar is specifically analyzing the totality of the 
circumstances in this discussion, he notes that the ultimate decision would depend 
on whether the benefit to the intern outweighed the benefit to the employer. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 
(1985).
210. Id.; see also Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 
(1961) (“[T]he ‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the test of 
employment.”); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (“[E]mployees are 
those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which 
they render service.”).
211. See Curiale, supra note 13, at 1543 (discussing how the Court applied 
the economic reality test to “volunteers”).
212. See, e.g., Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 
522, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying a primary benefit test and stating that “it is the 
‘economic reality’ of the relationship between parties that determines whether their 
relationship is one of employment or something else”); Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying a totality of the 
circumstances test but noting that the ultimate test is one of economic reality).
All Work, No Pay 1593
However, the application of the economic reality test provides 
little practical guidance for courts to use when determining whether a 
student intern is an employee under the FLSA.213 For instance, 
though the Sixth Circuit recognized the overarching importance of 
examining the economic reality of the working relationship, it further 
stated that the economic reality test alone was too broad because it 
did not provide a “question to answer, factors to balance, or some 
combination of the two.”214 Thus, if the court in Glatt had attempted 
to apply only the economic reality test, it is unclear what analysis it 
would have undertaken.215 In other words, the statement that an 
employment relationship is dependent on the economic reality of the 
situation provides little guidance without a more specific test to 
apply.216
Another weakness of the economic reality test is that it has 
been primarily applied in cases involving independent contractors, 
and it is questionable whether this test can be easily mapped onto 
internship cases.217 For instance, the economic reality test examines 
circumstances such as the independent contractor’s opportunity for 
profit or loss and the contractor’s investment in special equipment, 
ultimately focusing on whether the contractor is dependent on the 
employer for finding business.218 These contractor situations provide 
little assistance in analyzing an internship, which primarily deals 
with the educational or learning experience afforded to a student, 
rather than the student’s level of economic dependence on a 
particular employer.219
Finally, the economic reality test has no cognizable basis in 
Portland Terminal, perhaps explaining why the Eleventh Circuit has 
been the only circuit to apply this test outside of the context of 
independent contractors.220 Because the economic reality test does 
not provide a decisive framework or factors for examining whether 
213. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 522-23.
214. Id. The court then proceeded to apply the primary benefit test and 
specific factors to determine which party received the primary benefit of the 
relationship. Id. at 529.
215. See id. at 522-23.
216. See id. (discussing how the economic reality test alone provides an 
incomplete analysis for courts to use in future cases).
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 15-16 (critiquing the 
application of the economic reality test to unpaid interns).
218. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2013) (citing Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 301-02 (5th Cir. 1975)).
219. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 16.
220. Id. at 31-32.
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an intern is an “employee,” it is unlikely that other circuits will adopt 
this test for classifying student interns absent additional guidance or 
factors to apply when analyzing unpaid internships.221
While the circuits have attempted to resolve the confusion 
surrounding the vague definitions in the FLSA, the resulting 
interpretations have led to even more uncertainty.222 This confusion 
is particularly problematic with regard to unpaid internships because 
students remain unprotected from employers who exploit this circuit 
court split to receive free labor.223 To resolve this split and the 
resulting confusion, the Supreme Court should examine the pros and 
cons of each test and adopt the test that would provide the most 
protection for interns and employers, while still deferring to 
Congress’s intent in creating the FLSA.224
IV. CHOOSING A SIDE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ADOPTING A UNIFORM 
TEST AND WHICH TEST SHOULD BE ADOPTED
The current circuit split and the rapidly increasing prevalence 
of internships create a need for uniformity in the way that vulnerable 
students are classified under the FLSA.225 Though all of the tests 
have both positive and negative aspects, each test’s outcome for 
classifying student interns under the FLSA is not equal.226 Keeping in 
mind Congress’s ultimate goal in adopting the FLSA—to provide 
broader protections for the average worker—and balancing this 
consideration with the values that make a test effective will allow for 
adoption of the test that is most apt to protect student interns from 
221. See id. at 31-33.
222. See supra discussion Part II (discussing the circuit court split created by 
the confusing definitions in the FLSA).
223. See PERLIN, supra note 8, at 63 (discussing how employers accept 
unpaid internships as a way to cut costs); see also Curiale, supra note 13, at 1537-38
(discussing the forms of exploitation that occur as a result of lack of protections for 
student interns).
224. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 11-12 (urging the 
Court to grant certiorari to resolve the current circuit court split).
225. See Curiale, supra note 13, at 1548.
226. Compare Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 
522-23 (6th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the economic reality test is not specific 
enough to be practical in situations involving students), with Kaplan v. Code Blue 
Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (utilizing the 
economic reality test to determine whether student interns were employees under the 
FLSA).
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illegal exploitation as free labor.227 Given these considerations, the 
Supreme Court should adopt the primary benefit test supplemented 
with the DOL factors to allow courts to consistently determine which 
party received a greater benefit from the relationship in order to 
provide protections to students who do not receive educational 
benefits.
A. The Need for a Uniform Test
As an increasingly populous group, it seems paradoxical that 
student interns receive some of the smallest levels of protection of all 
the working groups.228 One reason for this lack of protection is that 
many student interns cannot easily bring lawsuits for unfair treatment 
or lack of compensation during unpaid internships because they are 
often buried in educational debt and do not have the means for 
expensive lawsuits.229 Moreover, even if students have the means to 
bring these lawsuits, many are hesitant to do so because they believe 
it will give them a bad reputation within their chosen field.230 If the 
ultimate goal of an internship is to provide students with a foot in the 
door, many students may believe that it would be unwise to tarnish 
their reputations by suing potential employers for noncompliance 
with the FLSA.231 However, the most significant reason is likely 
because the rapidly increasing number of internships has led to much 
confusion about whether student interns are covered by the FLSA, 
resulting in uncertainty regarding employers’ obligations and making 
it increasingly difficult for courts to resolve these issues in a way that 
provides broad protections for interns.232
Adopting a national standard for evaluating internships under 
the FLSA can alleviate some of the problems with unfair treatment 
227. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (defining the policy behind adoption of the 
FLSA); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
228. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 218-22 (describing the most common 
issues facing student interns as a result of their unclear classification, including 
sexual harassment and age, wealth, gender, and, less commonly, race 
discrimination).
229. See id. at 218, 223-24. The lack of income and ability to obtain other 
employment because of unpaid internships also keeps many students from being 
able to afford expensive lawsuits.
230. Id. at 232.
231. See id. This argument is advanced as one reason for a lack of lawsuits 
brought by unpaid interns. See id. Another is that unpaid interns are unaware that 
they may be entitled to compensation under the FLSA. Id.
232. PERLIN, supra note 8, at 66.
1596 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1561
of student interns by providing clarity in advance of creating an 
intern relationship.233 Because a uniform test will allow for greater 
understanding of employers’ obligations, colleges and universities 
can educate students and potential employers about strict compliance 
with the FLSA and can create helpful guidelines, such as advising 
employers to provide a certain number of educational hours or 
feedback, to ensure that interns obtain the maximum benefit from 
their working experience.234 Though it may be argued that the same 
result can be obtained by allowing each circuit to adopt its own test 
for interpreting the FLSA, the FLSA is a federal law that should be 
interpreted consistently across the nation.235 More importantly, 
because many unpaid internships take place in “glamorous fields” in 
nationally based companies, a national standard would ensure that 
interns working for the same company in different locations are 
classified consistently regardless of where they are working.236
Another potential avenue for adopting a uniform standard is 
through rulemaking by the DOL or legislation by Congress; 
however, these solutions have been advocated by other 
commentators with little response.237 In fact, problems with unpaid 
internships have persisted for several years, and Congress has yet to 
respond through legislation,238 and the DOL has responded only with 
a series of nonbinding opinion letters.239 Given that Congress and the 
DOL have been slow to respond thus far, it is unlikely that a rapid 
change will occur in the near future.240 In the meantime, the Supreme 
Court should take up the issue and create a uniform test for 
233. See EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 193, at 4-5.
234. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 236 (proposing a three-part test for 
students participating in school-sponsored internships).
235. See Bacon, supra note 7, at 70.
236. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 218 (noting that some of the most 
prestigious internships take place in the fields of politics or entertainment at 
companies such as the American Civil Liberties Union, CNN, Merrill Lynch, MTV, 
and Rolling Stone).
237. See Curiale, supra note 13, at 1549-51 (arguing that rulemaking is the 
best solution to the current problems facing internship law); Yamada, supra note 21,
at 246 (arguing that congressional amendments to employment statutes are the 
“cleanest way” to solve the problems); EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 
193, at 5 (arguing that the best solution to the problem would be for Congress to 
amend the FLSA to include student interns).
238. See LaRocca, supra note 13, at 142.
239. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57; see also Bacon, supra note 7, at 75 
(noting that the guidelines issued by the DOL in 2010 were merely a restatement of 
prior guidelines with no significant improvements).
240. LaRocca, supra note 13, at 142.
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classifying interns under the FLSA.241 Given the recent success of the 
interns in Glatt, more students will likely be willing to take their 
chances with a lawsuit, giving the Court an opportunity to address 
the issue and solve the circuit split.242
B. The Values of an Effective Test
Having determined that a national standard created by the 
Supreme Court through judicial review is the best option for 
promoting the goal of the FLSA, it is necessary to examine the 
policy considerations that determine the effectiveness of any 
particular test adopted by the Court. Many legal scholars have 
pondered the implications of adopting bright-line rules versus 
flexible standards, often arguing that these options individually can 
advance only some of the goals of the judiciary.243 While these goals 
are numerous and often broad, they are useful in determining 
whether a particular test is serving its purpose.244 The list of values 
examined here is not exhaustive; yet, it provides helpful guidance to 
determine which test is most appropriate in the context of unpaid 
internships.245
One of the most important values for an effective test is that it 
provides justice and fairness to those who choose to use the court 
system to resolve their disputes.246 An effective test must not unfairly 
benefit one party or group of individuals, but instead must ensure 
that justice is provided to the party who deserves it under the law.247
In the case of unpaid internships, the DOL stated that “exclusion 
241. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 11-12.
242. Greenfield, supra note 3. In Glatt, the court also granted class action 
status to the student interns, resolving some of the problems that interns have with 
affording expensive lawsuits and giving them a greater ability to bring lawsuits as a 
group. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
243. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form 
and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 73-75 (2002); Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
57-69 (1992); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright 
Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 777 (1995).
244. See Wilson, supra note 243, at 777.
245. For a more thorough discussion of these considerations, see generally 
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
246. Id. at 392 (noting that interpretation based on standards generally 
examines values such as fairness and community).
247. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 157-67 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing 
the basic notion of justice in law and describing why justice is an important value 
for criticizing legal principles).
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from the definition of employment is necessarily quite narrow,”
suggesting that the fairest test is one that more often than not 
classifies interns as employees because it provides the highest level 
of protection for students.248 Additionally, student interns are 
relatively powerless in the working relationship and need more 
protection as a result of their vulnerability.249 Ultimately, the test 
adopted by the Court must fairly weigh the considerations between 
interns and employers, with a presumption that excluding interns 
from classification as employees is a rare exception.250
In addition to being fair, a good test should provide 
predictability both to individuals who intend to bring lawsuits and to 
those who want to avoid being sued.251 If a test is too subjective or 
returns different results among analogous cases, individuals will lose 
trust in the court system, thereby creating hesitancy to bring 
meritorious cases for fear of how they will be decided.252 In fact, in 
the context of unpaid internships, one court characterized tests that 
are subjective and unpredictable as “unmanageable.”253 Although 
tests cannot create perfect certainty in the outcomes of cases, there 
should be at least some understanding that certain cases will come 
out in a certain way.254 Absent this basic level of predictability, the 
creation of a test is virtually useless because it provides little 
incentive for individuals to bring lawsuits and lacks the objectivity 
necessary for people to understand their status under the law.255
Additionally, an effective test should be consistent with prior 
jurisprudence regarding the specific practice area.256 For example, for 
unpaid internships, an effective test must align with Supreme Court 
248. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
249. Student interns are often young and either unaware of their rights or 
afraid to report issues because of their low status within the company. See Curiale, 
supra note 13, at 1537.
250. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
251. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (critiquing the primary benefit test as “unpredictable” in its 
outcomes).
252. See HART, supra note 247, at 229 (“For one of the typical functions of 
law, unlike morality, is to . . . maximize certainty and predictability and to facilitate 
the proof or assessments of claims.”).
253. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532 (analyzing the subjectivity of the primary 
benefit test based on the amount of learning that takes place among students).
254. Schlag, supra note 245, at 411.
255. Id.
256. Of course, if a distinction can be made from prior decisions, the 
resulting decision can be considered “consistent” with prior jurisprudence by 
distinguishing it from prior case law. HART, supra note 247, at 135.
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precedent for interpreting employee under the FLSA, most notably, 
Portland Terminal.257 Thus, to be effective, any test for the 
classification of unpaid interns must be consistent with Portland 
Terminal’s decision regarding the classification of trainees.258 As 
with the consideration of predictability, the need for consistency with 
prior jurisprudence stems from a desire to obtain respect for the 
judiciary.259 Absent this consistency with prior case law, judges will 
be accused of deciding cases based on their own personal beliefs, 
rather than through sound legal analysis that the public expects and 
desires.260
Finally, an effective test should provide practical factors, 
elements, or some other form of analysis for courts to consistently 
apply in future cases.261 Without any guidance for courts in future 
cases, a test cannot be effective because it does not provide the 
objectiveness, fairness, and predictability mentioned above.262
Keeping these considerations in mind will allow for resolution of the 
current circuit split in a way that provides the greatest levels of 
fairness and predictability for interns and employers, and the 
necessary consistency with prior decisions, such as Portland 
Terminal.
C. Proposed Solution: The Primary Benefit Test Supplemented by 
the DOL Factors 
Given the pros and cons of each test and the considerations for 
a proper test, the Supreme Court should adopt the primary benefit 
test from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits263 and supplement this 
test with the DOL factors to determine which party received the 
benefit.264 Practically, this test would mirror the one used by the 
257. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
258. See Curiale, supra note 13, at 1540 (stating that Portland Terminal was 
the origin of the DOL factors as well as courts’ interpretation of the FLSA in many 
contexts, including unpaid internships).
259. See HART, supra note 247, at 136 (discussing the policy implications 
and importance of consistency to jurisprudence and public standards of the 
judiciary).
260. See id.
261. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 523 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (“There must be some ultimate question to answer, factors to balance, or 
some combination of the two.”).
262. See id.
263. See discussion supra Section II.B.
264. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
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Sixth Circuit in Laurelbrook.265 More importantly, this test would 
provide courts with the proper level of objectivity and flexibility, 
allowing them to tailor the analysis to the particular internship and to 
balance the important interests of both employers and students.
Adoption of the primary benefit test supplemented with the 
DOL factors not only implicates many of the considerations of an 
effective test, but it also provides advantages that would otherwise be 
unattainable with other tests.266 For instance, one of the greatest
strengths of the proposed solution is that it provides factors for courts 
to apply in future cases—a key consideration absent from the 
economic reality test.267 The importance of this consideration can be 
demonstrated through an example. Suppose a court attempted to 
apply the economic reality test to an internship at a large magazine 
company. The court would begin by asking, “What is the economic 
reality of the working relationship?”268 Because this is the only 
inquiry provided by the economic reality test, the court would have 
no further guidance for its analysis.269 While the court could 
potentially use economic dependence to determine the economic 
reality, as some courts have done with independent contractors,270
this analysis, too, would prove unhelpful because the court would 
always come to the same conclusion—that unpaid interns do not 
receive compensation and are thus never economically dependent on 
employers.271
By contrast, the proposed solution provides both a question to 
answer and factors for courts to apply to decide this answer. Because 
the crux of the primary benefit test requires balancing the two 
parties’ perceived gains from the relationship, courts need only 
determine which party gained a greater benefit as a result of the 
265. The Sixth Circuit noted that the primary benefit test was the appropriate 
test for interpreting the FLSA but also examined DOL factors that helped determine 
the primary benefit. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 529.
266. See discussion supra Section III.B.
267. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 523.
268. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 292, 
301-02 (1985) (stating that the test for an employee is one of economic reality and 
distinguishing the case from Portland Terminal).
269. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 522-23 (questioning the specific inquiry in 
an economic reality test). But see Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 
1311-12 (11th Cir. 2013) (utilizing a factored test to determine the economic reality 
of the relationship and applying it to the case at bar).
270. See discussion supra Section II.C.
271. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 523 (noting that under the economic 
reality test, “‘[i]t is dependence that indicates employee status’” (quoting Usery v. 
Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976))).
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internship.272 To reach this conclusion, courts can apply the DOL 
factors, such as whether the relationship displaces paid employees,273
whether the employer’s work was hindered by the intern’s 
presence,274 or whether there is educational value derived from the 
internship.275 In fact, in its application of the primary benefit test, the 
Sixth Circuit stated, “Additional factors that bear on the inquiry 
should also be considered insofar as they shed light on which party 
primarily benefits from the relationship.”276 Unlike the economic 
reality test, the proposed solution would be fairly easy to apply 
because it creates a balancing test with objective factors to analyze to 
reach a definitive conclusion.277
The proposed solution also allows for a level of predictability 
that would be lacking if the Supreme Court adopted the totality of 
the circumstances test.278 To demonstrate, suppose a court examining 
whether an internship complies with the FLSA decides to use the 
DOL factors based on a totality of the circumstances test. While this 
approach allows for application of specific factors, how will the 
court decide which factors weigh more heavily than others?279
Moreover, how can it be guaranteed that different courts will weigh 
the factors similarly?280 In the internship context, this subjectivity 
does not provide employers with the predictability necessary to allow 
them to understand whether they are complying with the law.281
By contrast, although the proposed solution also uses the DOL 
factors, the ultimate goal of determining the primary benefit provides 
272. Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1982).
273. This factor can suggest that the employer received the primary benefit 
by cutting costs and replacing paid employees with unpaid ones. See FACT SHEET 
#71, supra note 57.
274. This factor can suggest that the intern received the primary benefit 
because he or she hindered the work of the employer, something a normal employee 
is ideally not going to do. See id.
275. This factor can suggest that the intern received the primary benefit so 
long as the educational value outweighed any value received by the employer. See 
id.
276. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 529.
277. Id. at 523.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88 (discussing the subjectivity 
of the totality of the circumstances test).
279. PERLIN, supra note 8, at 67 (arguing that the totality of the 
circumstances test is inherently subjective).
280. See id. (noting that this test practically ensures inconsistency and 
subjectivity).
281. In fact, subjectivity in internship contexts leads to many problems with 
national companies. See id.
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a check against uncertainty by demonstrating which consideration 
ultimately receives the most weight.282 If the Supreme Court adopts 
the proposed solution, courts and employers alike will be aware that 
interns’ educational gain must be the primary focus of the 
internship.283 This awareness will allow employers to tailor their 
internships to ensure strict compliance with the FLSA.284 For 
instance, employers can ensure that educational training is part of the 
internship and can periodically supervise students throughout the 
internship.285 Using both the primary benefit test and the DOL factors 
incorporates important considerations of an effective test by giving 
courts objective considerations to weigh and creating a higher level 
of predictability than the totality of the circumstances test.286
While greater levels of predictability can create lesser levels of 
flexibility,287 adopting the proposed solution will provide a balanced 
level of both considerations. Though the primary benefit test alone 
provides some level of flexibility by balancing the parties’ perceived 
gains, supplementing the test with the DOL factors creates even 
greater flexibility.288 Because each internship is different, a rigid 
test—such as the all-or-nothing approach advocated by the DOL in 
Fact Sheet #71—would not allow for individual consideration based 
on the differing situations.289 For instance, some critics take issue 
with the DOL’s all-or-nothing approach because the absence of one 
factor automatically creates an employment relationship for an 
282. EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 193, at 4-5.
283. See id. at 5, 7.
284. See id. at 5 (arguing that a test similar to the one proposed here would 
“benefit employers by reducing uncertainty surrounding the legal status of their 
interns” and would also “make it easier for employers to understand their 
obligations”).
285. See id. at 4-5.
286. This flexibility is particularly important in the context of unpaid 
internships because the future of unpaid internships is indefinite and adoption of a 
flexible standard allows for more adaptability to changing circumstances. See
Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 4, 7 (1987).
287. See Wilson, supra note 243, at 777.
288. See Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141-42
(2d Cir. 2008).
289. See PERLIN, supra note 8, at 66 (discussing how employers have tried to 
“squeeze” internships into the six-factor test that creates an exemption from 
employee status).
All Work, No Pay 1603
unpaid internship that would otherwise be legal.290 While this 
approach is certainly protective of interns, it is also problematic, 
particularly in regard to element four, which requires that the 
employer receive no immediate advantage from the relationship.291
Because it is rare that an employer receives no advantage from hiring 
an unpaid intern, the all-or-nothing approach creates a virtually 
impossible standard that is inherently inflexible.292 However, 
applying the proposed solution and using the DOL factors as a 
balancing test, rather than a checklist of elements that must all be 
met, gives courts a method to determine whether the employer or 
student received the primary benefit while creating a test that is 
flexible enough to be applied to every internship.293
Another advantage to adopting the proposed solution is that it 
has a strong basis in Supreme Court precedent by way of Portland 
Terminal.294 In Portland Terminal, the Court noted that a person who 
works for his own benefit and receives the instruction of another 
cannot be considered an employee for FLSA purposes.295 This 
language indicates that the Court applied a form of the primary 
benefit test to trainees by suggesting that these individuals worked 
for their own benefit and could not be considered employees.296 The 
Court also applied several factors for determining whether the 
employers received an advantage, showing that the Court 
contemplated the use of descriptive factors for the determination of 
which party primarily benefitted.297
Moreover, student interns can be analogized to trainees, 
demonstrating that Portland Terminal has even more precedential 
value.298 Trainees typically work for a particular company in order to 
learn the aspects of a job in the hopes of getting hired for permanent 
290. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (noting that the DOL’s test “is overly rigid” because “no one factor,” or 
absence thereof, should control); see also supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
291. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
292. Some commentators have noted that element four means that no work 
can be performed by interns that would provide any benefit to the employers. See 
Bacon, supra note 7, at 79; see also Unpaid Internships - Common but Illegal, LAB.
& EMP. L. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2007), http://laborlaw.typepad.com/labor_and_
employment_law_/2007/11/unpaid-internsh.html.
293. See Wilson, supra note 243, at 777 (discussing the flexibility of 
standards as compared to rigid rules).
294. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 32.
295. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1947).
296. Id. at 152.
297. Id. at 149-50.
298. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 32.
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employment.299 Interns, too, work for certain companies in the hopes 
of gaining more practical experience in a particular field and getting 
a foot in the door.300 In fact, some may even hope to obtain 
permanent employment with the company for whom they are 
interning.301 While distinctions can be made between interns and 
trainees, such as the type of work performed and the length of time 
spent in the training process, the similarities between the two 
relationships combined with the support for the primary benefit test 
and DOL factors provided in Portland Terminal suggest that this 
solution is steeped in precedent.302 Additionally, this test has been the 
dominant test used by the circuits for interpreting the FLSA,303
further implying its usefulness and applicability to unpaid interns.
Finally, and most importantly, adoption of the proposed 
solution would solve many of the practical problems with the current 
circuit split. Not only would adoption of a single test ensure that all 
interns are analyzed the same way under the FLSA,304 but employers 
would also be aware of this interpretation so they could avoid 
illegally exploiting interns in the first place.305 Additionally, one 
advantage to Supreme Court review over congressional rulemaking 
is that Supreme Court review tends to generate more publicity than 
congressional action, providing a greater likelihood that interns will 
be made aware of their rights and that employers will be more apt to 
correct for violations of the law.306 Further, this approach provides at 
299. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 150 (describing the process by which 
trainees at the Portland Terminal Company were hired).
300. Bacon, supra note 7, at 68 (explaining the importance of internships to 
students who want to get ahead and noting that “[s]tudents rely on internships for 
getting into their careers”).
301. However, the DOL factors make it clear that an intern cannot expect to 
receive permanent employment after the internship and still be considered an intern. 
FACT SHEET #71, supra note 57.
302. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 32 (discussing how 
the primary benefit test comports with Portland Terminal).
303. See discussion supra Part II (examining the circuit court split).
304. One intern who petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari argued 
that “a consistent test should be applied throughout the country so the FLSA’s 
coverage concerning minimum wage and overtime pay is not dictated by the circuit 
in which an intern or extern works.” See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
16, at 30.
305. EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 193, at 6 (arguing that 
employers should inform students of their rights prior to the internship’s start).
306. For instance, one newspaper article suggested that the Glatt ruling in the 
Southern District of New York had the impact of “setting a precedent for future 
disgruntled worker bees and also scaring potential intern abusers into paying their 
summer or short-term staffers some actual money.” Greenfield, supra note 3. If a 
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least some deference to the agency that created the FLSA and is 
charged with its interpretation because it utilizes the DOL factors to 
determine which party received the benefit of the relationship.307
Admittedly, adoption of the proposed solution, or any test in 
general, will not solve all of the problems with the current state of 
internship law.308 As noted earlier, the primary benefit test has been 
critiqued for being unpredictable in its outcomes and for creating 
difficulties in determining who receives the primary benefit of the 
work.309 However, the proposed solution leads to more predictability 
than the other tests, even if it does not achieve complete 
predictability.310 Additionally, while it may sometimes be difficult to 
determine which party received the primary benefit, by encouraging 
courts to focus on the educational value of the working relationship, 
courts need not be so concerned with “balanc[ing] out thirty hours of 
data entry with thirty minutes of database training,” as one scholar 
criticizes.311 Instead, by focusing on the educational value students 
gain from the internship and the profit employers gain from free 
labor, courts can readily determine whether interns deserve 
compensation for the menial work they perform or whether they 
have been compensated through the valuable education that they 
would not have otherwise received.312
A single test adopted by the Court will not alleviate all the 
struggles that unpaid interns have in regard to bringing lawsuits in 
district court case could have this impact, a Supreme Court case would likely be 
much more impactful. See id.
307. As briefly noted earlier, the level of deference to afford the DOL Fact 
Sheet has been in contention among lower courts as well, so providing deference to 
the DOL at some level is important. See supra note 84.
308. See supra text accompanying note 243.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
310. For instance, the totality of the circumstances test is not limited to a 
certain number of factors, giving judges almost complete discretion to determine 
what factors should be examined and how they should be examined. See Yamada, 
supra note 21, at 235. On the other hand, the economic reality test has no factors for 
courts to examine, leaving it up to judges to determine how to discover the 
economic reality of the working relationship. See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & 
Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2011). By contrast, the proposed solution 
gives judges factors to consider and creates a balancing test for judges to weigh 
these factors, limiting the amount of discretion judges have and creating more 
predictability. See supra text accompanying notes 282-86.
311. See PERLIN, supra note 8, at 67.
312. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 529 (noting that the primary benefit test 
reflects the goals of the FLSA in distinguishing between workers and volunteers and 
is broad enough to encapsulate non-traditional working relationships, such as 
internships).
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the first place.313 However, given Congress’s lack of response and the 
importance of unpaid internships to today’s economy,314 the Court’s 
review of the circuit split and adoption of the proposed solution will 
provide a necessary step in the right direction toward greater 
protection of unpaid interns.315 Ultimately, the Court’s willingness to 
examine and solve this issue will indicate the seriousness of violating 
the FLSA and will allow courts and employers to consistently correct 
for illegal exploitation of today’s students.316
CONCLUSION
The story about Glatt and Footman’s legal victory has been 
widely publicized since the Southern District of New York reached 
its decision in June 2013.317 Anger, frustration, excitement, and 
triumph were only some of the emotions surrounding the decision to 
classify these overworked students as employees and to compensate 
them under the FLSA.318 In the wake of Glatt, many attorneys, 
interns, and employers alike expressed frustration with the current 
state of the law, crying out for change and expressing a desire for 
fully explained guidelines that conform to the FLSA and provide 
protections for confused and mistreated students.319
Had the Supreme Court adopted the proposed solution prior to 
the lawsuit filed by Glatt and Footman, it is likely that this case 
313. Notably, Glatt also granted the unpaid interns class action status, 
potentially alleviating some of the issues with interns being unable to pay for 
lawsuits. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). In fact, the attorney for Glatt and Footman noted that what class status “really 
does mean is interns can pursue these claims on the class basis.” See Greenfield, 
supra note 3.
314. LaRocca, supra note 13, at 142.
315. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (discussing Congress’s intent behind 
adopting the FLSA as protecting vulnerable workers).
316. See Greenfield, supra note 3 (discussing how the decision in Glatt has 
helped to expose the current problem with internship law).
317. See, e.g., Ellin, supra note 1 (discussing the decision in Glatt); 
Greenfield, supra note 3 (discussing how Glatt was a victory for student interns); 
Greenhouse, supra note 8, at B1 (discussing the implications of the decision in 
Glatt).
318. Greenhouse, supra note 8, at B1.
319. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 11-12 
(requesting the Court to grant certiorari and solve the circuit split); Sam Hananel, 
Unpaid Internships in Jeopardy After Court Ruling, WASH. TIMES (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/14/unpaid-internships-jeopardy-
after-court-ruling/ (discussing the importance of the decision in Glatt and the impact 
it could have on the future of unpaid internships).
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would not have been filed.320 In fact, having a concrete and uniform
rule governing intern–employer relationships would have allowed 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. to know before the internship began 
whether these students should have been paid.321 By adopting the 
proposed solution, the Court will ensure that internships remain a 
critical part of a student’s entrance into the workforce while 
providing students with a full and enlightening experience without 
fear of exploitation. For employers, a uniform test will allow them to 
properly train the next generation of workers without being 
concerned about getting sued for not complying with a vague and 
poorly defined law.322
Though only a small percentage of petitions for certiorari are 
actually granted during each Supreme Court term,323 the influx of 
lawsuits predicted by the triumph in Glatt will likely give the Court 
ample opportunity to address this issue once and for all.324 The 
Supreme Court should, and hopefully will, review the circuit court 
split in the near future and adopt the proposed solution to provide 
stronger protections for vulnerable students. Until or unless this 
happens, thousands of unpaid student interns will continue to work 
for no pay—many without any idea that they may be entitled to 
compensation under the FLSA.325
320. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
321. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
322. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
323. Frequently Asked Questions, SUP. CT. U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi2 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
324. Greenfield, supra note 3 (predicting that student interns will be more 
willing to challenge internships).
325. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 232.

